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NOTES ANDCOMMENTS
ACHIEVING SEX-REPRESENTATIVE INTERNATIONAL COURT BENCHES
By Nienke Grossman*
Twenty-five years ago, in this Journal,HilaryCharlesworth,ChristineChinkin, and Shelley
Wright argued that the structures of international law “privilege men.”1 As shown in Table 1,
which summarizes data from a forthcoming article, on nine of twelve international courts of
varied size, subject-matter jurisdiction, and global and regionalmembership, womenmade up
20 percent or less of the bench in mid 2015.2 On many of these courts, the percentage of
women on the bench has stayed constant, vacillated, or even declined over time.3 Women
made up a lower percentage of the bench in mid 2015 than in previous years on two-thirds of
the courts surveyed.4
For courts where states were required by statute to take sex into account when nominating
or voting for judges, a higher percentage of women sat on the bench in mid 2015. Examples
include the International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the ad litem benches of the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY,
respectively). Thirty-two percent of the judges on these courts were women in mid 2015.
Where a “fair representation” of the sexes was not aspired to or required, womenmade up only
15 percent of the bench.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; Deputy Director, Center for International
and Comparative Law. I would like to thank for their comments and feedback on this project Cindy Galway Buys,
Harlan Grant Cohen, Susan Franck, Claudio Grossman, Audrey McFarlane, Darren Rosenblum, Colin Starger,
Eric Voeten, and Markus Wagner. I am grateful for comments received at the New York University Colloquium
on International Law and Justice, the Junior International Law Scholars Association meeting at the University of
California, Berkeley, the Association of American Law SchoolsWorkshop onTransnational Perspectives on Equal-
ity Law, and the University of Bruxelles “Le juge est une femme” conference, as well as for research assistance from
Harvey Morrell and Adeen Postdar. I also wish to thank Irene Klinger and Ezequiel Steiner for their support and
encouragement throughout this project.
1 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin& ShelleyWright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AJIL
613 (1991).
2 For amore comprehensivedescriptionof thedatapresented in this article and its sources, seeNienkeGrossman,
Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 213 (forthcoming 2016).
3 Id.
4 Id. Although not the focus of this article, women are also found in low numbers in investor-state dispute res-
olution.Only 6.5 percent of known investment treaty arbitration appointmentswerewomenuntilMay 2010.Two
women,GabrielleKaufmann-Kohler andBrigitte Stern, accounted for 75 percent of female appointments, whereas
the two most frequently appointed men accounted for 5 percent of the appointments of male arbitrators. See, e.g.,
Gus van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59 COLUM. FDI PERSP. (Feb.
6, 2012); see also Susan D. Franck, James Freda, Kellen Lavin, Tobias Lehmann & Anne van Aaken, The Diversity
Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible College” of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 429, 430
(2015) (finding through a survey of attendees at the Congress of the International Council for Commercial Arbi-
tration that 17.6 percent of arbitrators were women).
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY CHART ON THE PAUCITY OF WOMEN JUDGES ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Court
Women in
Mid 2015
(%)
Slots Occupied
byWomen
from 1999 to
Mid 2015 (%)
Representation
Requirement?
Level of
Guidance or
Transparency
at National
Level
Institutional
Screening
Year
Established
African Court on
Human and
People’s Rights
2/11 (18%) 18% Yes:
aspirational
Lower No 2006
Andean Tribunal
of Justice
2/4 (50%) 17% No Lower No 1984
Appellate Body of
theWorld Trade
Organization
1/7 (14%) 17% No Lower Yes 1995
Court of Justice for
the Economic
Community of
West African
States
1/7 (14%) 40% No N/A Yes 2001
European Court
of Human
Rights
15/45 (33%) 29% Yes:
aspirational
1999–2003;
virtually
mandatory
since 2004
Higher Yes 1959
European Court of
Justice
5/28 (18%) 14% No Higher N/A 1952
Inter-American
Court of
Human Rights
1/7 (14%)a 16% No Lower No 1979
International
Court of Justice
3/15 (20%) 11% No Lower No 1946
International
Criminal Court
7/18 (39%) 47% Yes:
mandatory
Lower Yes 2003
International
Criminal
Tribunal for the
Former
Yugoslavia
Permanent:
2/19
(11%)
Ad litem: 1/3
(33%)
Permanent:
11%
Ad litem: 41%
Yes:
aspirational
for ad litem
only
Lower No 1993
International
Criminal
Tribunal for
Rwanda
Permanent:
2/9 (22%)
Ad litem: 0/1
(0%)
Permanent:
22%
Ad litem: 35%
Yes:
aspirational
for ad litem
only
Lower No 1996
International
Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea
1/21 (5%) 2% No Lower No 1996
a Inmid 2015, nowomenwere on the Inter-AmericanCourt ofHumanRights, but because onewomanwas elected
to join the Court starting in 2016, she is included here.
2016] 83NOTES AND COMMENTS
From1999 to2015, four of thefive courtswith thehighest percentages of judicial slots occu-
pied by women had either mandatory or aspirational language in their statutes or selection
rules. The year 1999 was the first in which any of the surveyed courts had such language. Per-
centages were obtained by dividing the total number of slots occupied by women each year by
the total number of slots occupied bybothmen andwomen each year.None of the seven courts
with the lowest percentages of women on the bench in the same period had sex-representation
requirements or aspirations.
The character and quality of selection procedures may also play a role in the percentage of
womenon thebench. It is difficult todraw statistically significant conclusions about the impact
of increased transparency or statutory guidance on national nomination procedures since nei-
ther is found in the vast majority of nomination procedures, and the sample size of twelve
courts is small. Nonetheless, a lack of transparency and the closed nature of nomination pro-
cesses on most international courts may depress the percentage of women on the bench over-
all.5 By contrast, institutionalized screening after nomination may increase balance on the
bench. For example, from 1999 until mid 2015, women occupied 29 percent, 40 percent, and
47 percent of judicial slots on the ECHR, the Court of Justice for the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), and the ICC respectively—three of the four courts with
institutionalized screening after nomination. But on the fourth court—the Appellate Body of
theWorldTradeOrganization (WTO)—women sat on thebenchonly17percent of the time.
In isolation the data on the percentage of women serving on these courts do not necessarily
support Charlesworth, Chinkin, andWright’s thesis of institutionalizedmale privilege in rela-
tion to international courts; instead, they could reflect low numbers of qualified female can-
didates in the pool of candidates, explaining proportionately low numbers on international
court benches. Yet, as discussed in part II below, the limited-pool argument is unpersuasive for
a number of reasons, including the limited role that merit plays in international judicial selec-
tion procedures and the constant or declining percentage of female judges over time on some
courts as thepool has grown. In addition,many stateswithhigher percentages of female lawyers
do not seat more international women judges.
States should take remedial steps to increase sex representativeness on the bench, both to
comply with their international legal obligations and to buoy the legitimacy of international
courts (part III). Reforms, described in part IV, might include making selection procedures
more open, transparent, andmerit based. Alternatively, states could signal their desire for sex-
representative benches through aspirational statements incorporated into court statutes or
selection procedures, or through temporary specialmeasures or quotas (part V). A quarter cen-
tury after the publication of “Feminist Approaches to International Law,”6 the time is ripe to
achieve sex-representative international court benches.
I. THE POOL OF AVAILABLE CANDIDATES
A shallow pool of qualified female candidates is a poor explanation for the overrepresenta-
tion of men on international courts. The pool argument provides that women are found in
lower numbers on courts without quotas because not enough qualified women are available to
5 See infra part III.
6 Charlesworth et al., supra note 1.
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occupy these prestigious positions. But if the pool were the reason for the paucity of women
judges, one might anticipate that the number of women on the bench would grow as women
enter law schools, the diplomatic corps, and the legal profession in greater numbers. This is not
the case for many international courts.
For the first fifteen years following the establishment of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 1996, no woman served on the 21-member bench. Since then, only
one woman has served ( Judge Elsa Kelly from Argentina), accounting for 2.5 percent of all
ITLOS judges.7 The number of women judges on the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights has stayed constant at two of eleven since its establishment in 2006. In total, four of the
twenty-two African Court judges, or 18 percent, have been women.8 On eight of the twelve
courts surveyed, a lower percentage of women sat on the bench in mid 2015 than in previous
years. On some courts, the decline is dramatic. For example, in 2004, women accounted for
60 percent of the ICTR’s ad litem bench, but since then that percentage has dropped precip-
itously; in 2011, only 20 percent of the ad litem judges were women. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) had as many as three female judges out of seven judges (43
percent) only a few years ago. The number then dropped to two and then to zero. One female
judge was elected to the seven-member bench in the last round of elections. Womenmade up
over 40 percent of theWTOAppellate Body only a few years ago, but in mid 2015, only one
woman sat on the seven-member bench. The same applies to ECOWAS.
If the pool argument were correct, one might expect that courts with similar subject-matter
jurisdiction would have similar percentages of women on the bench. Yet, the ICC had 39 per-
cent women on the bench in mid 2015, whereas the ICTR had 22 percent permanent female
judges, and the ICTY, 11 percent. In addition, between 1999 and 2015, women held 41 per-
cent of ad litem slots on the ICTY bench but only 11 percent of permanent slots. In the same
period,womenheld 35percent of ad litem slots on the ICTRbut only 22percent of permanent
ones.
Using thepercentageofwomen lawyers in a country as aproxy for thepool, onemight expect
that states with a higher percentage of women lawyers would have a higher percentage of
women judges. For many states, this does not appear to be the case. For example, no French
woman has served as a permanent judge on the European Court of Justice, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), ECHR, ICC, ICTR, ICTY, or ITLOS—although twenty-five men
have.9 Fifty percent of France’s lawyers are estimated to be female.10 Twenty-four Britishmen
and one British woman have served on the European Court of Justice, ICC, ICJ, ECHR, and
7 Members of the Tribunal Since 1996, at https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/members-of-the-tribunal-since-
1996/.
8 See Judges of the Court, at http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-the-court/jurisdiction-3/judges.
9 Sevenmen have served on the European Court of Justice, including one for two separate terms. Five men have
served on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). One man has served on the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Five men have served on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as permanent judges.
Three men have served as permanent judges on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), and one of them (Claude Jorda) also served on the joint appeals chamber for the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the ICTY. Three men have served on the International Criminal Court (ICC).
One woman,Michele Picard, served as an ad litem judge on the ICTY. The data was drawn from the court websites
referenced in Grossman, supra note 2, at 223 n.43.
10 EthanMichelson,Women in the Legal Profession, 1970–2010: A Study of the Global Supply of Lawyers, 20 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1071, T. A6 (2013).
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ICTY.11Abouthalf of theUnitedKingdom’s lawyers are estimated tobewomen.12NoRussian
woman served on any of the five international courts on which Russian men served, although
about half of Russia’s lawyers are women.13 By contrast, China has appointed onewoman each
to the WTO Appellate Body and ICJ, and seven men to the ICJ, ICTR, and ICTY.14 About
one-fifth of China’s lawyers are female.15
The limited-pool argument assumes that judicial selection procedures aim to choose the
most meritorious candidates. Yet, international judgeships are often used to reward political
loyalty or to advance political agendas, rather than to select the most qualified or meritorious
candidates.16 A recent election to the IACHR illustrates the point.While praising the “long and
deep commitment to human rights” of one judicial candidate, an independent panel expressed
grave concerns about another candidate’s ability to remain impartial and independent with
respect to his country’s human rights record.17 The former lost the election, and the latter
replaced himon the bench. In the same vein, one study showed that eight of twenty-five judges
at the ICTY and the shared ICTY/ICTR appeals chamber had no prior criminal judicial expe-
rience.Many of them had no experience in international criminal law, andmany did not have
even fifteen years of relevant professional experience.18 Also, it is widely acknowledged that
international judicial elections are often the result of political horse-trading among states.19
States trade votes for their candidates across a number of international courts. Such an inter-
national election system does not require any analysis of a candidate’s qualifications. The pool
argument losesmuch of its purchase ifmerit is not the driving factor in the international judge-
selection process.
Finally, about 195 judges sit on the twelve benches surveyed in this study.Openings happen
periodically on each of them. The pool need not be large to increase the percentage of inter-
national judgeships filled bywomen.Alternatively stated, it is difficult to believe that in aworld
of over 7 billion people, only one woman is qualified to sit on the seven-member benches of
the ECOWAS, IACHR, and WTO Appellate Body, and on the 21-member bench of ITLOS.
11 Six men have served on the European Court of Justice, whereas two served on the ICC. Seven served on the
ECHR, and three served on the ICTY as permanent judges. Sixmen and onewoman, RosalynHiggins, have served
as judges on the ICJ bench. See Grossman, supra note 2, at 223 n.43.
12 Michelson, supra note 10.
13 Id.Threemenhave servedon theECHR.On the ICJ, fivemen servedonbehalf of theUnionof Soviet Socialist
Republics and four on behalf of the Russian Federation. Two men were judges for ITLOS, and three for the ICTY
and ICTR combined. See Grossman, supra note 2, at 223 n.43.
14 Four men have served on the ICJ, and three on the ICTY and ICTR combined. One woman serves on the
ICJ and one on the World Trade Organization’s Appellate body. See Grossman, supra note 2, at 223 n.43.
15 Michelson, supra note 10.
16 See, e.g., RUTHMACKENZIE, KATEMALLESON, PENNYMARTIN&PHILIPPE SANDS, SELECTING INTER-
NATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 95 (2010); Cherie Booth & Philippe Sands, Keep Pol-
itics out of the Global Courts, GUARDIAN (UK) ( July 13, 2001).
17 FINALREPORTOFTHE INDEPENDENTPANEL FORTHEELECTIONOF INTER-AMERICANCOMMISSION-
ERS AND JUDGES 25–26, 29 ( June 2, 2015), at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/iachr-
panel-report-eng-20150603.pdf.
18 Michael Bohlander, The International Criminal Judiciary—Problems of Judicial Selection, Independence and
Ethics, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES
354 (Michael Bohlander ed., 2007).
19 See, e.g., 1 SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920–2005,
at 384 (2006); Ruth MacKenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the
International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 271–72 (2003).
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II. WHY STATESMUST ACT TO REMEDY SEX-UNREPRESENTATIVE BENCHES
States are legally required to take steps to understand and remedy the paucity of women
judges onmost international court benches. TheUNCharter declares that theUnitedNations
“shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity
and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.”20 The ICJ is the
UnitedNations’ “principal judicial organ,” as described in theCharter.21The ICTRand ICTY
are both creations and subsidiary organs of theUNSecurity Council.22 Although the ICCwas
not created by the Council, it has a unique relationship with the United Nations. Pursuant to
itsChapterVII powers—the samebasis for establishing the ICTRand the ICTY—theCouncil
can refer situations to the ICC in the absence of the usual temporal, personal, and territorial
jurisdictional requirements.23 Also, the Negotiated Relationship Agreement Between the
International Criminal Court and theUnitedNations established links between the two insti-
tutions, including close cooperation on personnel standards and a number of administrative
matters.24 Given this relationship, the UN Charter’s provisions on equality at least arguably
apply to the ICC and also to the ICJ, ICTR, and ICTY.25
States’ obligation to remedy skewed international court benches extends beyond courts that
are tied to theUN system. Several human rights treaties require states to act in favor of equality
of the sexes regarding participation in public life. For example, Article 25 of the International
Covenant onCivil and Political Rights provides that states will “undertake to ensure the equal
rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights” found in the cov-
enant, including access on “general terms of equality” to public service.26 Regional human
rights instruments impose similar obligations.27 In theConvention on the Elimination ofDis-
crimination AgainstWomen, Article 8 requires states to take appropriate measures to “ensure
20 UNCharter, Art. 8. The preamble “reaffirm[s] faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”
21 Id., Art. 92.
22 SCRes. 827 (May 25, 1993) (ICTY); SCRes. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (ICTR);TheUnitedNations SystemChart
(2015), at http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/UN_System_Chart_30June2015.pdf.
23 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 13(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
24 NegotiatedRelationshipAgreementBetween the InternationalCriminalCourt and theUnitedNations, ICC
Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1 (Oct. 4, 2004).
25 Furthermore, in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action, statesmade political commitments to “[a]im at gender
balance in the lists of national candidates nominated for election or appointment to United Nations bodies, spe-
cialized agencies and other autonomous organizations of the United Nations system.” Platform for Action, para.
190(j) (Sept. 15, 1995), inReport of theFourthWorldConference onWomen,UNDoc.A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1,
ch. I, Res. 1, Annex II (1996).
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 3, 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
27 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, OASTS No. B-32, 1144 UNTS
123 (Every citizen has the right and opportunity to “take part in the conduct of public affairs” and “to have access,
under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his country.”); see also Inter-American Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment, andEradication ofViolenceAgainstWomen,Art. 4, June 9, 1994, 33 ILM1534 (rec-
ognizing women’s right “to have equal access to the public service of her country and to take part in the conduct
of public affairs, including decision-making.”); African Charter onHuman and Peoples’ Rights, Arts. 13, 18, June
27, 1981, 1520 UNTS 217, 21 ILM 58 (All citizens shall have “the right of equal access to the public service of his
country” and the “State shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women.”); Protocol to the Afri-
canCharter onHuman andPeoples’ Rights on theRights of Women inAfrica, Art. 9(2), July 11, 2003,OAUDoc.
CAB/LEG/66.6/Rev. 1, at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ (“States Parties shall ensure
increased and effective representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making.”); Protocol No.
12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 1, Apr. 4, 2000, ETS
No. 177 (“1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
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to women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination, the opportunity to rep-
resent their Governments at the international level and to participate in the work of interna-
tional organizations.”28Article 7 provides that statesmust takemeasures to “eliminate discrim-
ination against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall
ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right . . . to hold public office and perform
all public functions at all levels of government.”29 The 1995 BeijingDeclaration and Platform
for Action, endorsed by 189 countries, emphasized the importance of the full participation of
women in decision making, calling for equal opportunities and participation of the sexes “in all
national, regional and international bodies and policy-making processes.”30 In International
LabourOrganizationConvention111, 172 states parties tookon the legally bindingobligations to
formulate and implement national policies to promote equal opportunity and treatment in respect
of employment, tomodifyadministrativepractices inconsistentwith thesegoals, and“topursue the
policy in respect of employment under the direct control of a national authority.”31
Not only are states legally obligated to ensure that bothmen andwomen are given equal oppor-
tunities to participate; the legitimacy of international courts can be adversely affected by sex-un-
representative benches. Conversely, this legitimacy can be enhanced by more representative
benches. International courts exercise public authority, and their authority requires justification. 32
These institutionsplay a vital role in thedevelopment andapplicationof the rules that govern inter-
state relations as well as in human rights and international criminal law. They decide when the use
of force is prohibited, what natural resources belong towhich states, what constitutes a violation of
theworld’s trade laws,whatconductqualifiesasan internationalcrimeorviolationofhumanrights,
andhowto remedybreaches of international law.Traditional sources of justification for these insti-
tutions’authority—primarily stateconsentandprocedural fairness tothe litigants—are insufficient
to ground their legitimacy, and alternative sources of justification are necessary.33
Representativeness is a democratic value that can serve to justify the exercise of authority.34 An
ICCbenchcomposedof judgesonly fromItalywouldbeproblematicbecause theworld isnotcom-
posed entirely of Italians.Abench composed entirely ofwomenwouldbeproblematic because half
of the world’s population is male. Significant underrepresentation of the world’s population can
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status. 2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority
on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.”).
28 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination AgainstWomen, Art. 8, Mar. 1, 1980, 1249
UNTS 13; ClaudiaMartin, Article 8 of the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
A Stepping Stone in Ensuring Gender Parity in International Organs and Tribunals (n.d.), at http://www.
gqualcampaign.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Advocacy-Piece-1.pdf.
29 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 28, Art. 7.
30 Beijing Declaration, para. 36 (Sept. 15, 1995), in Report of the FourthWorld Conference onWomen, supra
note 25, ch. I, Res. 1, Annex I.
31 Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 111), Arts. 2–3,
June 25, 1958, 362 UNTS 31; Ratifications of C111, at http://www.ilo.org.
32 Gra´inne De Bu´rca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 226–27
(2008). Armin vonBogdandy& IngoVenzke,On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking,
12 GERMAN L. J. 1341, 1343 (2011).
33 Nienke Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 68–76 (2013);
Armin vonBogdandy& IngoVenzke, In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and
Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 8 (2012).
34 Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the Legitimacy of International Courts?, 12
CHI. J. INT’L L. 647, 668–69 (2012).
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undermine the democratic legitimacy of an institution. Furthermore, the consistent overrepresen-
tationofonegroupon thebench,whennot causedby limitations in thepool, raisesquestions about
the integrity of selection proceduresmore generally, which can affect perceptions of a court’s legit-
imacy. Alternatively stated, policies or procedures that result in diminished opportunities for par-
ticipation of half theworld’s population can undermine these institutions’ public authority by fail-
ing to reflect the world’s population and by giving rise to actual or perceived bias.
At the international level, few studies of a gender effect of judging exist, in part because the
paucity of women on the bench detracts from the statistical significance of any conclusions.35
Yet, at least one study in the investment law field and another in the international criminal law
field suggest that women andmenmay approach some issues differently.36 Several prominent
female international court judges—including Patricia Wald, Navanethem Pillay, and Cecilia
Medina Quiroga—have proposed that the presence of female judges may make a difference
to understanding the facts in a case and to judicial decision making.37 In any event, members
of underrepresented or excluded groups, includingwomen,will question the authority of insti-
tutions where they make up only a low percentage of top decision makers.38
A lack of gender balance on the bench also has important collateral effects. For example,
more women behind the dais may result in more gender-balanced legal teams in front of it.
Since the number of women on the ICJ’s bench has grown from one to three out of fifteen,
someof these judges have called formorediverse counsel to argue litigants’ cases.A recent study
showed that only four women versus fifty-nine men appeared more than once before the ICJ
from 1999 to 2012.39 (Incidentally, the paucity of women oral advocates does not explain the
paucity of women on the bench since the vastmajority of ICJ judges does not appear to be drawn
from the ranks of oral advocates.)40 The presence ofwomen judges provides added justification for
legal teams to look for and includemore women lawyers. Also, women in positions of power may
create greatermentorship opportunities and affectwomen’s and girls’ perceptions about their roles
and possibilities in society.One study showed thatwomen and girls weremore likely to participate
in and discuss political issues when more women were members of parliament.41
35 See Kimi L. King&MeganGreening, Gender Justice of Just Gender? The Role of Gender in Sexual Assault Deci-
sions at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 1049, 1050 n.2 (2007) (not
including the ICTR in a study on the gender effect of judging because “there are too few [women judges] to conduct
empirical analysis and virtually all the guilty defendants received life sentences”).
36 Id.; Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? 35 (paper presented at the ASIL Research Forum,
Los Angeles CA (Nov. 3–5, 2011)), at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256023521_Are_Arbitrators_Politi-
cal.
37 PatriciaWald, Six Not-So-Easy Pieces: One Woman’s Journey to the Bench and Beyond, 36U.TOL. L. REV. 979,
989 (2005); Patricia Wald, What Do Women Want from International Criminal Justice? To Help Shape the Law,
INTLAWGRRLS (Oct. 5, 2009), athttp://www.intlawgrrls.com/2009/10/what-do-women-want-from-internation-
al.html; DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO & LEIGH SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 48, 186–87 (2007) (con-
taining comments by former ICC Judge Navanethem Pillay and former IACHR Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga).
38 Grossman, supra note 34, at 664–65.
39 ShashankKumar&CecilyRose,A Study of Lawyers Appearing Before the International Court of Justice, 25EUR.
J. INT’L L. 893, 904 (2014).
40 According to the curricula vitae of the fifteen currentmembers, available on the ICJ’s website, only three have
served asCounsel in cases before the ICJ:ChristopherGreenwood,GiorgioGaja, and JamesCrawford.Three served
as agents for their states: Ronny Abraham, Peter Tomka, and Kirill Gevorgian.
41 Christina Wolbrecht & David E. Campbell, Leading by Example: Female Members of Parliament as Political
Role Models, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 921–39 (2007); see also, e.g., Kijana Crawford &Danielle Smith, The We and the
2016] 89NOTES AND COMMENTS
III. STEPS FOR ACHIEVING SEX-REPRESENTATIVE BENCHES
Greater Transparency at the National Level and Institutionalized Screening at the International Level
States have both legally binding obligations and non-legally binding reasons for supporting
balanced benches. But what concrete steps can they take? First, states canmake national nom-
ination procedures more transparent and open. Of the twelve courts surveyed, as shown in
Table 1 above, a greatmajority had closed, opaquenational nominationprocedures. As regards
many international courts, little to no statutory or other guidance to states exists for selecting
candidates at the national level. States are left to craft their own procedures, with no interna-
tional or domestic oversight. Even on courtswhere some guidance is provided (such as the ICC
and ICJ), scholars have raised doubts that it is followed. A series of interviews about selection
procedures on these courts showed that “fewwell-informed insiders appear to be familiar with
the details,”42 and processes varied significantly across states and were “marked by their lack
of transparency and accountability.”43 One interviewee described the process of nominating
judges to the ICJ and ICC as “not very institutional-like, [more] a friendship thing.”44 Others
wrote that “one cannot apply to become an international judge” but rather must be “called”
and that perhaps the most important factor is “being on the radar screen of, and appreciated
by, one’s own government, particularly by some key civil servants.”45
The opacity and closed nature of national nomination procedures facilitate the nomination
of well-connected insider candidates. Nominators have little incentive to move beyond their
personal networks or to refrain from acting in a self-interested way by nominating individuals
who can help them professionally in the future or validate their own qualifications. Twenty
years ago, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth wrote that international commercial arbitrators
“promote the forms of symbolic capital that give maximum value to their personal character-
istics, but also they try to build symbolic capital that will allow them to prosper and succeed
in the changing environment.”46 The same motivations likely apply to international court
nominators. Further, access to the kinds of experiences that build symbolic capital may them-
selves be subject to similar gatekeeping. For example, few women have served on the Interna-
tional Law Commission, but four of the last five judges elected to the ICJ spent time on that
body.47Without transparency and openness, not only is it difficult for potential candidates to
apply, but also no accountability exists for nominators.
In response to these shortcomings, states can take concrete steps to publicize openings on
international courts and to craft national nomination procedures with explicit and publicly
known standards and time-lines. The Parliamentary Assembly andCommittee ofMinisters of
the Council of Europe have led the way in this regard with respect to the ECHR. For example,
Us: Mentoring African American Women, 36 J. BLACK STUD. 52 (2005) (referring to the importance of mentoring
to the career development of African American female administrators in higher education).
42 MACKENZIE et al., supra note 16, at 64–65.
43 Id. at 95.
44 Id. at 86.
45 TERRIS et al., supra note 37, at 23.
46 YVES DEZALAY& BRYANTG. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 10, 29 (1996).
47 International Law Commission, Membership (2012–2016), at http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml.
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the committee urged states to make the procedure for eliciting applications “stable and estab-
lished in advance through codification or by settled administrative practice,” and to publicize
its details in the call for applications, on government websites, and wherever else may be rel-
evant.48 The call for applications should bemadewidely and publicly available so that “it could
reasonably be expected to come to the attention” of suitable candidates.49 The committee
noted that additional measures may be appropriate to raise awareness of the call for applica-
tions—such as acting to encourage interest on thepart ofwomenandethnic or otherminorities
that are less likely to apply for ECHR judgeships.50Other examples ofmeasures includedmax-
imizing transparency in selection, raising awareness about the work and life of judges in Stras-
bourg, public lectures, placing articles or interviews in journals and in wider media, and
speeches and interventions by sitting or former judges.51 States could create selection com-
mittees to consider and vet nominees. They could be obliged to provide information to
other states, court registries, and relevant assemblies of states parties or the general public
about the procedures used to select candidates, specifying what considerations they took
into account.
At the international voting level, screening committees could be established to vet and rec-
ommend candidates for election. Such screeningmay be correlatedwith greater representation
of women on the bench. For example, as demonstrated in Table 1 above, three of four courts
that utilize institutionalized screening mechanisms to interview and evaluate candidates had
relatively high numbers of female judges in mid 2015 or high percentages of slots occupied by
women since 1999 or since establishment, whichever came later. The courts were the ICC,
ECHR, and ECOWAS, with 39 percent, 33 percent, and 14 percent of women serving on the
bench inmid 2015, respectively.Historically, women have occupied 47 percent of the slots on
the ICC,29percent on theECHR, and40percent onECOWAS.The fourth courtwith screen-
ing, theWTOAppellate Body, had only 14 percent women judges in mid 2015, and women
occupied 17 percent of judicial slots since its establishment. Nonetheless, the courts with the
lowest percentages of women on the bench since establishment included those with the least
amountof screening, such as theAndeanTribunal of Justice (12percent), IACHR(10percent),
ICJ (3 percent), and ITLOS (2 percent).
The ECHR and ICC are two potential models for institutionalized candidate screening.
The Assembly of State Parties created an Advisory Committee on Nominations to the ICC,
which assesses whether nominees meet the Rome Statute’s requirements.52 It conducts inter-
views andmakes determinations about the extent of candidates’ knowledge and experience, as
well as their proficiency in the Court’s working languages.53 The Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe called for the vetting of nominees, starting in 1996, through both
48 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, CM(2012)40 Addendum Final, 4.4 Guidelines of the Com-
mittee of Ministers on the Selection of Candidates for the Post of Judge at the European Court of Human Rights–
Explanatory Memorandum, pt. C(III)(1) (Mar. 29, 2012).
49 Id., pt. C(III)(2).
50 Id., para. 42.
51 Id., para. 43.
52 International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 10th Sess., Report of the Bureau on the Establish-
ment of an Advisory Committee on Nominations of Judges of the International Criminal Court, ICC Doc. ICC-
ASP/10/36 (Dec. 21, 2011).
53 International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 12th Sess., Report of the Advisory Committee on
Nominations of Judges on theWork of Its SecondMeeting, ICCDoc. ICC/ASP/12/47, para. 10 (Oct. 29, 2013).
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interviews and the screening of candidates on behalf of the entire Assembly.54 A newCom-
mittee on the Election of Judges to the ECHR began operating in January 2015, and it
studies standardized curricula vitae of candidates, conducts interviews, and provides rec-
ommendations and rankings of candidates.55 It is also chargedwith ensuring that the nom-
inating state complied with the Assembly’s criteria for the establishment of lists.56
Nongovernment organizations or independent experts can encourage greater transparency
at the national level and more rigor at the international level. For example, the Open Society
Justice Initiative established a panel of independent experts to assess and recommend candi-
dates to the IACHR.57TheCoalition for the InternationalCriminalCourt played a similar role
in vetting nominees until the creation of the Advisory Committee on Nominations.58 UN
treaty bodies with relevant mandates could also assist in monitoring states’ obligations to
ensure equal opportunity to participate in the conduct of public affairs. For example, theCom-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Human Rights Com-
mittee of the United Nations could question states on their international judge-nominating
and -voting procedures as they monitor the implementation of the Convention on the Elim-
ination of Discrimination Against Women and of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, respectively.59
Aspirational Statements for Gender Balance or Quotas
Although enhanced openness and transparency at the domestic level and screening at the
international levelmay lead to better gender balance on the bench, statesmay on occasion have
reasons to oppose suchmeasures. For example, if states wish to control tightly the nomination
process and to screen their own candidates for ideological reasons, they will hesitate to create
screening committees or to open up domestic nomination processes. But when states view
courts and judges as “trustees” of specific normative regimes or when theywish to demonstrate
their commitment to judicial independence, they may favor open national nominations and
international screening procedures.60 Aspirational statements for gender balance on the bench
or quotas are alternative policy choices for states wishing to increase the percentage of women
on the bench.Of the five courtswith the highest percentage ofwomenon the bench from1999
to 2015, four had either aspirational statements for inclusion or quotas (see Table 1). None of
the seven courts with the lowest percentages of women on the bench had either. In mid 2015,
womenmade up32percent of bencheswith such requirements and only 15 percent of benches
without them.
54 Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1082, Procedure for Examining Candidatures for the Election of Judges to the European
Court of Human Rights (Apr. 22, 1996).
55 Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 2002, Evaluation of the Implementation of the Reform of the Parliamentary Assembly
( June 24, 2014).
56 Id.
57 FINALREPORTOFTHE INDEPENDENTPANEL FORTHEELECTIONOF INTER-AMERICANCOMMISSION-
ERS AND JUDGES, supra note 17.
58 Coalition for the InternationalCriminalCourt,Delivering on the Promise of a Fair, Effective and Independent
Court  Election of ICC and ASP Officials  Judges, at http://www.iccnow.org/?modelectionjudges.
59 See supra part III.
60 See Karen J. Alter, Agents or Trustees? International Courts in Their Political Context, 14 EUR. J. INT’L REL.
33, 35, 39–40 (2008).
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States have chosen to use aspirational statements for greater balance on the bench on at least
three occasions with respect to the African Court onHuman and Peoples’ Rights and ad litem
judges on the ICTR and ICTY. These statements signal to states that sex representativeness is
a priority for the states parties to the relevant court. The African Court’s statute provides that
at the international election stage, states must ensure that “there is representation of the main
regions of Africa and of their principal legal traditions” and also that there is “adequate gender
representation.”61 For ad litem judges on both international criminal tribunals, nominating
states are required to take “into account the importance of a fair representation of female and
male candidates.”62 Two slots of eleven have been held by women on the African Court since
its establishment in 2006, but one can only speculate on what the numbers would have been
in the absence of the statutory language. Between 1999 and 2015, a much higher percentage
of womenhave served on the ad litem benches of the ICTR and ICTY than on their permanent
benches.During this period,womenoccupied 22percent of permanent judge slots and35per-
cent of ad litem slots on the ICTR. On the ICTY, 11 percent of permanent judge slots went
to women versus 41 percent of ad litem slots. These numbers suggest that even a political com-
mitment to some form of parity can have meaningful consequences.
Quotas or temporary special measures appear effective at getting women on the bench.
Unsurprisingly, the courts with quotas or virtual quotas have among the highest percentages
of women on the bench. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that
states must take into account a “fair representation of female andmale judges” when voting.63
If less than twice as many candidates are available than the number necessary to fulfill gender
(and regional) voting requirements, the president of the Assembly of States Partiesmay extend
the nomination period up to sixweeks.64 At the voting stage, each state party is required to vote
for a minimum number of candidates of each gender, and only ballots complying with all the
various voting requirements—including gender representation—are valid.65 The percentage
ofwomenon the ICChas never dropped below39percent since establishment, and 47percent
of all judicial slots have gone to women since establishment.
On the ECHR, as soon as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe began
bringing attention to the issue of sex representation in 1996, the percentage of women on the
bench jumped from 3 percent in 1997 to 18 percent in 1998. In 2004, the Parliamentary
Assembly decided that it would no longer consider unisex lists of candidates for election to the
ECHR.66 The percentage of women judges rose from 23 percent in 2004 to a peak of 40 per-
cent in 2011. After Malta refused to include a female on its three-candidate list, the ECHR
issued an advisory opinion in 2009 that prohibited the Parliamentary Assembly from rejecting
candidate lists when nominating states have taken “all the necessary and appropriate steps” to
61 Protocol to the African Charter onHuman and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and People’s Rights, Art. 14(2), (3), June 10, 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III),
at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/court-establishment/.
62 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Art. 13 ter(1)(b) (Sept.
2009), at http://www.icty.org/sid/135; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 12 ter(1)(b) (as
amended, Jan. 31, 2010), at http://unictr.unmict.org/en/documents/statute-and-creation.
63 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 23, Art. 36(8)(a)(iii).
64 International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Procedure for the Nomination and Election of
Judges of the International Criminal Court, Res. ICC-ASP/3/Res.6, para. 11 (Sept. 10, 2004).
65 Id., paras. 20, 22.
66 Eur. Parl. Ass. Res. 1366, Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights ( Jan. 30, 2004).
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ensure that candidate lists include a member of the underrepresented sex, especially following
an open and transparent procedure including a call for candidates.67 Despite the softening of
the list requirement, women made up 33 percent of the bench in mid 2015. From 1999 to
2015, women occupied 29 percent of judicial slots on that court.
Counter-arguments to the use of thesemeasures include that they are appropriate onlywhen
“women’s concerns” are ameaningful component of the subject-matter jurisdiction of a court,
when women and men judge differently, or only when those women elected “represent”
women in their decision making. These arguments are flawed. The decisions of international
courts on international economic law, maritime delimitation, and the use of force affect both
men andwomen, and fall within the exclusive domain of neither. They are equally bothmen’s
and women’s concerns. Whether or when men and women judge differently is irrelevant.
States have committed themselves to givingmen andwomen equal opportunities to participate
in governance at all levels, through the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Charter,
andother soft law instruments.68Noexception to these obligations canbemadebasedonproof
that men and women decide differently. Finally, women should bear no added obligation to
“represent” women, particularly because no such litmus test is applied to male candidates.
Another counter-argument is that quotas put unqualified women on the bench and thereby
detract from a court’s authority or legitimacy. First, as discussed above, qualifications do not
appear tobe theprimarydriving factor inmany international judicial elections in thefirst place.
Second, while some have blamed efforts at parity when a less qualifiedwoman has been elected
to the bench, they do not appear to fault gender when a less qualified man is elected; instead,
such an election is attributed toother causes, such as aflawed selectionprocedure. Perhapsmost
persuasive, the data suggest that qualified women are being kept off the bench and not that
unqualified women are being put on it. Eight of twelve courts surveyed inmid 2015 had lower
percentages of women on the bench than in previous years, although one can reasonably
assume that more qualified women are available today than in the past. And countries where
women are prestigious lawyers, judges, and academics have failed to put women on interna-
tional court benches at all or in any meaningful way.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICALWILL FOR REFORM
Does thepoliticalwill exist tomake thenecessary reforms to achieve sex-representative inter-
national court benches? Individuals interviewed about selection procedures on the ICC and
ICJ, while enthusiastic about the need for geographical diversity, were “ambivalent” about the
need to include more women on the bench.69 States appear to support gender balance on the
benchmorewidely for human rights courts and international criminal courts, as demonstrated
by the institution of gender balance quotas and the requirement that states take a fair repre-
sentation ofmale and femalemembers into account formany of these courts. Nonetheless, the
67 Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates Submitted with a View
to the Election of Judges to the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33, para. 54 (GrandChamber
2009).
68 See supra part II.
69 MACKENZIE et al., supra note 16, at 48–49.
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IACHR has no such quotas or aspirational statements. It is rare to hear focused criticism of the
sex-skewed ITLOS or WTO Appellate Body.
Yet, at the same time, awareness and recognition appear to be growing among many in the
international community that sex representativeness is an important goal to aspire to on bodies
involving international law and relations. Various voluntary gender-balance or parity initia-
tives have taken off recently. An example is the International Geneva Gender Champions ini-
tiative, launched in July 2015, which gives heads of international organizations and represen-
tatives ofmissions inGeneva the opportunity to commit publicly to strive for gender parity on
panels and to undertake two additional “concrete, measurable, accountable institutional
actions” in one year “to advance gender equality,” either in executive management or in pro-
grammatic work.70 Possible commitments include supporting the advancement of female col-
leagues and working towards gender parity in delegations to the United Nations.71 Among its
signatories are the director general of the UN office in Geneva, Michael Møller, U.S. Ambas-
sador Pamela Hamamoto, and at least seventy other ambassadors and chiefs of international
organizations in Geneva.72
The Gqual Campaign for Gender Parity in International Representation, launched in Sep-
tember 2015 at the UnitedNations inNew York, seeks to achieve parity on international law-
making and influencing bodies, including international courts, tribunals, and treaty-monitor-
ing bodies.73 Its founding document—signed by hundreds of individuals, including
academics, high-level state officials, andmembers ofmany of these bodies—calls for the estab-
lishment of mechanisms at the national and international levels to establish gender parity and
seeks to obtain pledges from states to nominate and vote in parity.74 In the same vein, in Sep-
tember 2015, the Human Rights Council of the United Nations reaffirmed that “the active
participation of women, on equal terms with men, at all levels of decision-making, is essential
to the achievement of equality, inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, peace
and democracy,” and “the obligation of States to take all appropriate measures to ensure that
every citizen has an effective right and opportunity to equal participation in public affairs.”75
Twenty-five years ago, “FeministApproaches to InternationalLaw” challengedus to rethink
and re-evaluate the structures and substance of international law through a feminist lens.While
progress has undoubtedly been made in the last quarter century, much remains to be accom-
plished. Achieving sex-representative international court benches will bring states into com-
pliance with their international legal obligations, enhance the legitimacy of international
courts, and advance the project of equality of the sexes in international institutions.
70 International Geneva Gender Champions, at http://genevagenderchampions.com/. The documents cited
below can be obtained through the main Web page.
71 International Geneva Gender Champions, Commitments.
72 International Geneva Gender Champion, Champions.
73 Gqual. The Campaign: An Overview, at http://www.gqualcampaign.org/our-work/. The documents cited
below can be obtained through the main Web page.
74 Gqual. The Gqual Declaration; Gqual. The Signatures.
75 HumanRightsCouncil, Equal Participation inPolitical andPublicAffairs, pmbl., para. 3,UNDoc.A/HRC/
30/L.27/Rev.1 (Sept. 30, 2015).
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